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COMMENTS
INDEMNITY AMONG JOINT TORT-FEASORS-
AS AFFECTED BY THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT
The case of Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Thetstone de-
cided by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1963 is apparent-
ly the only United States case in which an employer has been
denied his common law right to indemnity, after being liable
under the FELA2 for failing to provide his employee a safe place
to work, when his negligence was only passive and the dangerous
condition was created by the active negligence of a third party.
In Whetstone, the defendant, doing business as the Commodity
Engineering Company, was in the process of constructing a
building adjacent to a spur track of the plaintiff. He erected
an unlighted scaffold in such close proximity to the track that
there was not sufficient clearance for the plaintiff's engines and
railroad cars to pass without striking the scaffold. At approxi-
mately 9:45 P.m., August 20, 1960, an employee of the plaintiff
was riding in the lead end of a tank car which was being moved
at a speed of about three or four miles per hour over the spur
track to a point beyond the place where the scaffold had been
erected. When the scaffold became visible, it was apparent that
the tank car could not clear it. The employee signalled for the
engineer to stop the car, but before this could be done, the car
struck it causing it to collapse and fall on the employee, seriously
injuring him. The employee subsequently made a claim against
the plaintiff under the FELA for failure to provide him with a
safe place to work. The plaintiff settled the claim for $6,000 and
then brought the present action for indemnity from the defend-
ant for the full amount paid. It was alleged that the injury was
directly and proximately caused by the active gross negligence
and carelessness of the defendant. The case was considered on
appeal from an order of the lower court sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint and affirmed. The court reasoned that in order
for an injured employee to recover under the FELA he must
prove that the employer was negligent and that such negligence
was the proximate cause, in whole or in part, of his injury, and
in the absence of such negligence there can be no recovery. Since
no liability of the plaintiff existed in the absence of negligence
on its part, it is logical to conclude that the plaintiff, in making
1. 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
2. Liability for Injuries to Employees Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1952).
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settlement with the injured employee, admitted that it was guilty
of actionable negligence and such was, at least, a concurring
proximate cause of the employee's injury. Since the plaintiff
asserts its right to indemnity, such action presupposes actionable
negligence of both parties towards the employee. The plaintiff
and the defendant were therefore joint tort-feasors and their
several acts united to produce the injury sustained by the em-
ployee of the plaintiff. It is said to be an established principle
of the common law that as between joint tort-feasors there can
be no right of contribution or indemnity, the rule being premised
on the doctrine that the courts are not open to wrongdoers to
assist them in adjusting the burdens of their misconduct, and
that the law will not lend its aid to one who founds his cause of
action on a delict.
This rule with regard to indemnity is subject to many excep-
tions. The ratio decidendi of the cases granting indemnity has
frequently been expressed in such general terms as the indem-
nitee was not personally at fault; the parties were not in pan
delicto; the negligence of the indemnitee was merely passive as
compared to the negligence of the indemnitor which was active;
and that the liability of the indemnitee was only secondary as
compared to the liability of the indemnitor which was primary.
It seems that such general propositions will not serve as adequate
standards to determine whether or not a tort-feasor guilty of
ordinary negligence may recover indemnity against a tort feasor
guilty of gross negligence. The plaintiff and defendant were
joint tort-feasors and even though their acts of negligence were
of different degrees, each united and concurred to produce the
injury sustained by the employee. The trial judge correctly sus-
tained the demurrer because there can be no indemnity among
mere joint tort-feasors.
In a vigorous and comprehensive dissent, Mr. Justice Brails-
ford stated that to apply the ordinary rule denying contribution
or indemnity between wrongdoers in this situation is unrealistic,
because the rationale of the rule (that the courts should not be
open to wrongdoers) is inapplicable. Here the plaintiff was
liable to its employee solely by reason of its failure to discover
and correct the dangerous condition created by the active negli-
gence of the defendant. No one would contend that, if on these
allegations, the plaintiff were claiming damages for an injury
to its locomotive, the complaint would be demurrable. That a
railroad may become liable to an injured employee by breach of
[Vol. 17
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its non-delegable duty to insure the safety of the place of work,
without an iota of actual negligence or wrongdoing on its part,
is clear under court interpretations of the FELA. Cases of this
type furnish classic examples of factual situations in which
justice requires the formulation of rules allowing indemnity,
even though the party seeking it is technically tarred with the
stigma of joint tort-feasor.
I. HiISTOricAL BACKGROUND
"Too great a refinement of analysis may lead one away from
the basic principle with which an argument began, and load the
thesis with unnecessary repetition and citations."3 While Justice
Bonham's sagacious statement is undoubtedly true, it seems
equally true that on an intricate point of law, too broad and
cursory an analysis may not only cause a court to miss the appli-
cable point of law, but also to create a dangerous precedent in
associated areas. This approach presents perhaps the most danger
in the law of torts, where, so often, no one explanation can be
found which will cover all of the cases.
4
A. Contribution
Although the rights of one tort-feasor to contribution and
indemnity from another are often considered together,6 it is
mandatory that the terms be distinguished from the outset. The
right of contribution is the right of one joint tort-feasor to force
another to pay his proportionate share of the damages, while
indemnity shifts the entire loss from the tort-feasor compelled
to pay it to the shoulders of another who should have paid it.
To date, only nine jurisdictions in the United States have
allowed contribution without some form of legislation: the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. In addition there are
some twenty-three states that have statutes which permit con-
tribution to some extent.(
The landmark English case of Merryweather v. Niza=7 is
generally credited with laying down the rule that there is no
3. Holcombe v. Garland and Denwiddie, 162 S.C. 379, 383, 160 S.E. 881,
882 (1931).
4. PRossER, ToRTs 48 (3d ed. 1964).
5. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172
(1963).
6. PRossER, supra note 4; for a complete listing of those jurisdictions hav-
ing statutes see Note, 61 YALE L. J. 964. 981-82 (1959).
7. 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng.Rep. 1337 (1799).
1965]
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right of contribution among joint tort-feasors. In this case a
third party had brought an action against the plaintiff and
defendant in trespass on the case as joint tort-feasors and recov-
ered a certain sum of money. He levied the whole amount on the
plaintiff, who then brought the action against the defendant for
contribution. Lord Kenyon stated that no such action existed
under the common law, but that this decision would not affect
cases of indemnity where one man employed another to do acts,
not unlawful in themselves.
At the time the case was decided, the action of trespass on the
case was considered in conjunction with the parent action of
trespass which had its origin in what today would be regarded
as the criminal law. The action retained so much of its criminal
aspect that tort liability appeared to be imposed solely as a pen-
alty for wrongdoing, like the functions of a criminal prosecution.
Therefore, it would follow that it would be just as improper to
allow one tort-feasor to force his fellow wrongdoer to share his
punishment as it would be to permit a person who, jointly with
another, was guilty of a crime to require a fellow criminal to
serve part of his sentence. This reasoning, even at this time,
would only seem to logically apply where the parties were con-
scious of their wrongdoing and were tort-feasors in the actual
and not merely technical sense. In the latter case the party forced
to pay might be guilty of neither moral nor social fault. Despite
the fact that this distinction was early made in England, Ameri-
can courts have used Merryweather v. Nixan as authority for
denying contribution in all cases."
B. Indemnity
While the doctrine barring contribution is likewise applicable
where indemnity, or complete restitution, is sought, all courts
in the United States (with the possible exception of South Caro-
lina) appear to permit the action in cases where equity clearly
demands that one party should bear the entire loss. One court
has frankly stated that here courts have been so liberal in finding
exceptions to the general rule that it can hardly, with propriety,
be called a general ruleD The consistent principle running
through all the cases seems to be that when both parties are guil-
ty of active or conscious negligence, or when both parties are
8. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 21 CoRixLL
L. Q. 552 (1935).
9. Miller v. N.Y. Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 372, 243 Pac. 118 (1926).
[Vol. 17
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guilty of passive negligence, no matter whether in varying de-
grees, the right of indemnity does not exist; however, where one
party is guilty of active and one of passive or technical negli-
gence the right of indemnity arises, as the parties are not in pari
delicto or in equal fault.
Indemnity thus turns on the kind and character, not the
comparative degree of negligence which caused the injury
and, it necessarily arises out of an independent legal rela-
tionship, under which the indemnitor owes a duty either in
contract or tort to the indemnitee apart from the joint duty
they owe to the injured party.10
An example of one line of reasoning is illustrated by the case
of Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R." where
a railroad employee had recovered against the railroad for an
injury received when he was snatched off the top of a moving
railroad car by a low hanging wire of the telephone company.
In allowing indemnity by the railroad the court stated that the
general rule is that recovery over as between wrongdoers may
not be had where they are in pani delicto. The cases which have
permitted recovery over have not been exceptions to the general
rule but have done so because they do not measure up to the
general rule which forbids recovery over; that is, the parties are
not found to be in pari delicto.
One of the best rationalizations of the right of indemnity is
stated by the New York Court of Appeals:
The right of indemnity, as distinguished from contribu-
tion, is not dependent upon the legislative will. It springs
from a contract, express or implied, and full, not partial, re-
imbursement is sought. Where several tort-feasors are in-
volved, an implied contract of indemnity arises in favor of
the wrongdoer who has been guilty of passive negligence, if
there be such, against the one who has been actively negli-
gent. The actively negligent tort-feasor is considered the
primary or principal wrongdoer and is held responsible for
his negligent act not only to the person directly injured
thereby, but also to any other person indirectly harmed by
being cast in damages by operation of law for the wrongful
10. Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.. 215 F.2d 368,
370 (10th Cir. 1954); see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 95 (1937).
11. 214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104 (1926).
1965]
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act. Whether negligence is passive or active is, generally
speaking, a question for the jury.
12
Perhaps the leading case in the United States on the right of
indemnity is that of Lowell v. Boston c L. R.R. 3 which in-
volved an accident when a third party drove into an excavation
made by the defendant railroad while it was constructing a road
crossing, which it had failed to protect by barriers. The third
party in a prior action recovered damages from the plaintiff
town because of its negligence in failing to keep its streets in a
reasonably safe condition and the plaintiff in turn sued defend-
ant for indemnity. It was argued that the plaintiff had no right
in as much as it had been negligent as well as the defendant. The
court in allowing indemnity by the town stated the general rule
that where two parties participate in the commission of a crim-
inal act, and one party suffers liability, he is not entitled to in-
demnity, or contribution from the other party. The court went
on to state that the law does not in every case disallow an action
by one wrongdoer against another for indemnity and that the
rule is in pan delicto potior est oonditio defendentis. If the par-
ties are not equally criminal, the principal delinquent can be held
liable by his co-delinquent for damages incurred by their joint
offense. Where any moral delinquency or turpitude is involved
in the offense, all parties are deemed equally guilty, and courts
will not inquire into their relative guilt; however, if the offense
is merely malum prohibitum, and is in no respect immoral, it is
not against the policy of the law to inquire into the relative de-
linquency of the parties, and to administer justice between them.
The court gives a number of analagous situations: where a serv-
ant unknowingly commits a tort on order of his master, the mas-
ter must indemnify him for any liability he incurs because he is
deemed the principal offender; where a sheriff's deputy takes
the property of A, on a writ of execution against B, the sheriff
can maintain an action for indemnity against the deputy for any
liability; and where A with a forged warrant arrests B and com-
mands 0, to whom he shows his warrant, to confine B a reason-
able time until he could carry him to prison, and C, being igno-
rant of the forgery, confines B accordingly, an action for indem-
nity by C against A would lie, notwithstanding both parties
were trespassers. The principle in all these cases is the same. The
12. McFall v. Campagnie Maritime Beige (Lloyd Royall) S.A., 304 N.Y.
314, 328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952).
13. 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839).
[Vol. 17
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parties are not in pari delicto, and the principal offender is held
responsible.
This right of a municipal corporation to indemnity was af-
firmed in the much quoted case of Washington Gaslight Co. v.
District of Columbia.14 Here a third party recovered against the
city because of a defect in the street created by the Gaslight Co.
In speaking for the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice White stated
that the city's right of indemnity qualified and restrained within
just limits the rigor of the rule forbidding recourse between
wrongdoers and that this rule is not predicated upon the peculiar
or exceptional rights of a municipal corporation but is general
in its nature.15
Perhaps with the exception of "master-servant" indemnity
cases, where the master who has been vicariously liable for the
tort of the servant is allowed indemnity from the servant, the
greatest number of cases seem to deal with municipalities. The
general rule in this country is that municipalities are invested
with full and complete control over the streets and highways
within their corporate limits and are charged with the duty of
keeping them in repair and free from menace. They are liable
in damages for injuries received as a consequence of their failure
to use such care as to keep them in a reasonably safe condition
for public travel."" Because of this duty the majority of states
hold the municipality liable where any defect or unsafe condi-
tion has been brought about by a third person. This liability
arises through the failure to correct the defect or unsafe condi-
tion within a reasonable time after it had knowledge of the
defect or was chargeable with such knowledge.' 7 In a seemingly
unbroken line of decisions, municipalities that have been held
liable have been allowed indemnity over against the third party
(where they did not join in the creation of the particular de-
fect),18 Even knowledge on the part of the municipality that
14. 161 U.S. 327 (1896).
15. Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 425 (1863) ; City of Brooklyn v.
Brooklyn City R.R., 47 N.Y. 478 (1872).
16. 25 Am. JUR. Highways § 348 (1938). South Carolina is with minority in
holding that no liability exists in absence of statute which is closely construed.
See Dunn v. Barnwell, 43 S.C. 398, 21 S.E. 315 (1895).
17. See: Malchow v. City of Leoti, 95 Kan. 787, 149 Pac. 687 (1915);
Dougherty v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 514, 158 S.W. 326 (1913) ; Johnson v.
City of Huntington, 80 W.Va. 178, 92 S.E. 344 (1917).
18. For extensive case listing see: 40 L.R.A. (NS) 1166 n. 2 (1912); 25
Am. Jur. Highways § 392 n. 10 (1940).
1965]
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this defective condition has been created is not sufficient to
prevent recovery absent additional circumstances.' 9
The reasoning upon which this right of the municipality is
based was early applied in the case of an individual held liable
due to the active intervention of a third party tort-feasor.
20
From these precedents it seemed an easy and natural result for
the courts to hold that a railroad has a right of indemnity when
held liable because of the active negligence of a third party who
had placed some obstruction on its tracks or premises. Massa-
chusetts allowed a railroad indemnity in a factual context anal-
agous to Whetstone in 1899.21
II. FDruAL E3IPLOYER's LiABm ACT
In 1908 the Federal Employer's Liability Act 22 was passed
to make it reasonably possible for employees of railroads to
recover for personal injuries, since common law rights were com-
pletely inadequate.23 The act provides:
Every common carrier while engaging in commerce be-
tween any of the several states . . . shall be liable in dam-
ages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of
such employee, to his or her personal representative, for
the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children
of such employee; . . . for such injury or death resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the offi-
cers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of
any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence, in its cars,
engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed . . . or other
equipment.24 (Emphasis added.)
19. For conditions under which recovery has been denied see Annot., 40
L.R.A. (NS) 1169-71 (1912).
20. Gray v. Boston Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873). The gaslight Co.
fastened a wire to plaintiff's chimney without his permission causing it to col-
lapse and fall on a passerby.
21. Old Colony R.R. v. Slavens, 148 Mass. 363, 197 N.E. 327 (1889). See
text accompanying note 68, infra.
22. Liability for Injuries to Employees Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§51-60
(1952).
23. Lewis, Federal Employers Liability Act, 14 S.C.L.Q. 447 (1962) states
that in 1888, a railroad brakeman had one chance in five of dying a natural
death. The average life expectancy of a railroad switchman in 1893 was seven
years. In 1907, the year before the act was passed 4,534 men were killed in rail-
road work and 87,634 were injured. In 1950, although more men were em-
ployed, only 329 were killed and 22,000 were injured.
24. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
[Vol. 1'7
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While contributory negligence on the part of the employee will
result in a diminution of damages it is not a defense to a tort
action under the act,2 5 nor is assumption of the risk.26 The most
pertinent concept of railroad liability under the act and probably
the most often used is the so-called "safe place to work" concept.
Although this is not spelled out as such in the act, it is based
on the above italicized portion making railroad employers liable
for injuries to employees caused by reason of any defect or insuf-
ficiency due to its negligence, in its cars, engines or other
equipment.
2
7
The act plainly requires negligence on the part of the railroad
as a prerequisite to its liability, and in at least one recent case,
the defendant railroad was held to be free from negligence and
thus not liable to its injured employee.28 It would, however, be
an understatement to say that railroads are held, through judi-
cial interpretation, to a much higher standard of care than that
required by the common law. The latest Supreme Court case in-
terpreting this duty is that of Shenker v. Baltimore 6 0. R.R.29
Shenker brought suit against the defendant railroad and the
Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad after he was injured while
loading sacks of mail into a P. & L. E. car. The door of the car
was defective so as to force Shenker to "twist around" to get
large sacks aboard the train. In so twisting, he ruptured an inter-
vertebral disc. Both railroads maintained stations at Morgan-
town, Pennsylvania, where Shenker worked, but B. & 0. fur-
nished employees for both stations. He was paid by B. & 0. and
was under its supervision. Judgment was directed in favor of
P. & L. E. on the ground that the evidence failed to establish
that Shenker was employed by them. A verdict of forty-thousand
dollars was found against B. & 0. by the jury. In upholding the
judgment the Supreme Court stated that B. & 0. had a duty
to inspect P. & L. E. cars before permitting its employees to
work on them and that it had taken no precautions to protect
them from possible defects in those cars.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justices Goldberg, joined by
J'ustices Harlan and Stewart, stated that there was nothing in
25. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1952).
26. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1952).
27. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R., 179 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.
Iowa 1959).
28. Inman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 361 U.S. 138 (1959). Here decedent em-
ployee was run over by an automobile while standing in the middle of a railroad
crossing; four justices dissented.
29. 374 U.S. 1 (1963).
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the record to show that B. & 0. had knowledge of any defect or
that a thorough inspection would have revealed one. He con-
tinued:
Under the rationale and result of this case, a railroad
would be liable for a defect which ]ust appeared immediate-
ly prior to the injury for which recovery is sought and even
the most scrupulous kind of inspection could neither have
avoided nor detected. What the court appears to have done
is to create not simply a duty of inspection, but an absolute
duty of discovery of all defects; in short, it has made the
B. & 0. the insurer of the condition of all premises and
equipment, whether its own or others, upon which its em-
ployees may work.30
One South Carolina case, decided in 1937, stated that liability
is governed by the act and the principles of the common law as
applied in the courts of the United States. 1 The South Carolina
courts are, of course, bound by the federal courts' interpretation
of the act.
3 2
Although the FELA obviously places a much stricter duty of
care on the railroads, the "safe place to work" requirement is
very similar to that required of municipalities, differing only in
degree. 3
Prior to the 1950's there were several cases in which indemnity
was allowed a railroad held liable to an employee because of the
active negligence of a third party.34 A representative example
is the case of Snohomis Oounty v. Great No. Ry.35 which was
appealed from the federal district court of Washington. Here the
plaintiff railroad was held liable for the wrongful death of one
of its employees when one of the plaintiff's passenger trains was
derailed because of debris washed onto the track. This was caused
by the collapse of a highway fill which occurred through the
negligence of the defendant county. The court held that the rail-
30. Id. at 14; Carney v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R.R., 316 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1963) decided a few months earlier held a railroad liable for an employee's
injuries resulting from the negligence of the YMCA, where the employee was
temporarily staying at railroad expense, in failing to make up his bed properly.
31. Williamson v. Southern Ry., 183 S.C. 312, 191 S.E. 79 (1937).
32. Thomas v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 S.C. 462, 71 S.E.2d 403 (1952).
33. 25 Am. Jun. Highways §373 (1940).
34. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Macon Ry. and L. Co., 140 Ga. 309, 78 S.E.
931 (1913); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. American Dist. Elec. Co-op. Co., 107
Fla. 833, 143 So. 316 (1932); Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104 (1926). See text accompanying note 11, supra.
35. 130 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1942).
[Vol. 17
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road's negligence in not discovering the dangerous condition
constituted passive but not active negligence and that the plain-
tiff and the defendant were not in pari delicto.,36 Prior to the
cases specifically considered in terms of the FELA, only one
jurisdiction has been found which denied a railroad the right of
indemnity in a Whetstone type situation. 7
Since there are apparently no cases prior to the Whetstone
case, arising under the FELA, in which indemnity has been
denied it will perhaps be most beneficial to discuss them with
regard to the problems that arise under the act. The rationale for
recovery has not been changed from that of LowelZ v. Boston
& L. R.R.,s8 but perhaps the best statement of that principle
with regard to FELA liability is from the case of Gulf, H. & 0.
R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer 00.39 This case involved an in-
jury to a railroad employee from a truck negligently parked too
near the railroad's sidetrack by the defendant trucking com-
pany. The railroad settled the employee's FELA claim and sued
the trucking company for indemnity. In holding that a right of
action existed, the court stated:
The vast growth of negligence law has markedly changed
the characteristics of negligence actions. Legal negligence no
longer embodies a concept of misbehavior just short of the
criminal or the immoral. The courts have, therefore, had to
find a way to do justice within the law so that one guilty of
an act of negligence-affirmative, active, primary in its
character-will not escape scot free, leaving another whose
fault was only technical or passive to assume complete lia-
bility. In dealing with the question, the courts have had
before them the problem . . . that in practically all cases
the indemnitee has himself been guilty of legal negligence.
This led to some confusion in terms used. That the vocabu-
lary of negligence law is not adequate for our day is appar-
ent from the contemporary writings on the subject. Thus in
these decisions the courts say plaintiff (indemnitee) was
without fault or that he was only technically negligent even
36. See Alaska S.S. Co. v. Pacific Coast Gypsum Co., 71 Wash. 359, 128
Pac. 654 (1912).
37. Glappa v. Boomer, 194 Mich. 52, 160 N.W. 542 (1916). The court clearly
recognized the concept of in pari dclicto; however, it was apparently felt that
as the train was moving at the time of the accident, this movement constituted
active negligence, even though the movement itself was not negligent.
38. 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839). See text accompanying note 13, supra.
39. 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951).
1965]
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though the liability was based on legal negligence. What is
meant is that plaintiff by act of defendant was made liable
for failing to discharge a responsibility even though he,
plaintiff, was not guilty of any active negligence ...
From the facts set forth in the second amended complaint
and the legal situation which confronted plaintiff we under-
stand clearly that what it meant was that the railroad was
guilty of only passive technical negligence and that the ac-
tive and primary negligence was that of defendant in placing
its truck where it was a danger to plaintiff's employees. 40
One problem arising under the act is that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense 41 to FELA claim. This fact caused a
Louisiana federal district court to disallow a railroad's claim to
indemnity.42 Although this case was later reversed on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 43 the court's reasoning is illustrative of the prob-
lem. The railroad's employee was killed as a result of an accident
caused by certain boxes and crates negligently placed too near
the railroad's tracks by a third party. The railroad was sued by
the employee's administratrix and it expressly pleaded contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the employee and cross claimed
against the third party for indemnity in the event liability was
established. In sustaining a demurrer to the cross-claim the court
stated that this was not the typical indemnity situation allowed
by the law of Louisiana,44 but that here there was a distinct
difference in the defenses available to the defendants. Proof of
contributory negligence is not a defense against the railroad,
but merely ground for diminishing the amount of recovery. This
obviously involves the invoking of the doctrine of comparative
negligence, which is unknown to the law of Louisiana. Were the
jury to find contributory negligence and indemnity were then
allowed, it would amount to subjecting the third party, which
is sued under the state laws, to the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence which had been rejected by the state courts. This problem
is simply solved by just submitting the question to a jury, and
recovery will be allowed only if it is found that the 8ole cause
40. Id. at 154, 98 N.E.2d at 787. Quoted in Atlantic Coast Line R1R. v.
Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 78-79, 132 S.E.2d 172, 180-81 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
41. 45 U.S.C. §53 (1952).
42. Wallace v. New Orleans Pub. Belt R, 78 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. La.
1948).
43. 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949).
44. See Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 91
So. 539 (1922).
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of the injury is the active negligence of the third party tort-
feasor.
45
Another problem attending these cases is the "good faith set-
tlement." It is common practice for railroads to settle employee's
claims arising under the FELA in view of the extreme difficulty
in defending them. The claim has then been made in the subse-
quent indemnity suit that the plaintiff was a "mere volunteer,"
or that it had conceded its negligence. The court in the case of
Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R. v. United States stated with regard to
this contention:
We think this contention is also without merit. It does not
follow from the finding here that plaintiff and its employee
'were in the exercise of due care and caution in their behalf'
[by the jury in granting indemnity to the employer in this
case], that a similar finding would have been made by the
triers of fact in an action by the employee against the plain-
tiff. Plaintiff at the time it made settlement with the em-
ployee did not have the benefit of such a finding. It was
required at that time to use its foresight rather than its
hindsight in evaluating the situation relative to its probable
liability. Taking into consideration that which we all know,
that is, the almost insurmountable difficulties attending the
defense by a railroad in an action for damages under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, it cannot be said that
plaintiff made other than a fair and reasonable settlement
of its potential liability. To have resisted settlement to the
point of a jury verdict would have been sheer folly under
the circumstances.
46
A third problem arises from the fact that, in a large portion
of these cases, the train is moving at the time of the accident.
The defense is then made that the movement of the train con-
stituted active negligence. The courts seem to have had likewise
little difficulty in disposing of this contention. The case of
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc.47 presented a
defense of this sort. The action was brought by the plaintiff for
indemnity against the defendant shipper after plaintiff had set-
tled a claim by one of its switch foremen. He had received in-
juries when his legs were caught between a boxcar upon which
45. United States v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R.R., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. United States, 187 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1951).
46. 220 F.2d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 1955).
47. 338 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Sup. 1960).
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he was riding and defendant's moveable dock. This was the
result of insufficient clearance due to the shipper's negligence.
The court had this to say of the defense:
It is said that the positive act of plaintiff in moving the
car . . . constituted active negligence. We have already in-
dicated our view that the failure of the plaintiff to discover
the dangerous condition would not be considered active
negligence. We are also of the opinion that that fact, coupled
with the movement of the train, would not amount to active
negligence under the circumstances of this case. There is
nothing in the transcript to indicate any contention at the
trial that plaintiffs were guilty of negligence in moving the
cars. The negligence of plaintiffs was in failing to discover
the dangerous condition and thereafter to either move the
dock or warn the injured trainman. Plaintiffs had a right
to move cars . . . and did so several times each day. In so
doing they were not guilty of negligence.4 8
The cases are numerous in the last fifteen years in which a
railroad has been granted indemnity for liability incurred to
its employees under the FELA.49 The Whetstone case appears
to be the first in which this right has been denied.5"
III. Co~ioN LAW RIGHTs OF CONTRmUTION AND INDEMnIT
n SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina has no statute allowing contribution and clear-
ly follows the majority common law view that contribution is
not allowed among joint tort-feasors. 51 Where less than all joint
tort-feasors are sued, the defendants have no right to bring in
other wrongdoers. 52 These rules in South Carolina tort law are
complicated by the rule, unique to South Carolina, that where
48. Id. at 8; See Booth-Kelley Lumber Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 183 F.2d
902 (9th Cir. 1950); Gulf, Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co.,
343 I1. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951).
49. See notes 39-40, 42-48, supra; Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Casura, 234 F.2d
441 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great No. Ry., 201 F.2d 408
(8th Cir. 1953) ; Sewanee Valley E. Co-op. v. Live Oak, P. & G. R.R., 73
So.2d 820 (Fla. 1954).
50. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E2d 172
(1963) (dissenting opinion).
51. Hills v. Price, 79 F.Supp. 494 (E.D. S.C. 1948); Brown v. Southern Ry.
111 S.C. 140, 96 S.E. 701 (1917).
52 Deas v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 171 S.C. 58, 171 S.E. 20
(1933) ; Little v. Robert G. Lassiter & Co., 156 S.C. 286, 153 S.E. 128 (1930).
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more than one joint tort-feasor is sued, the jury may apportion
the damages. 53
South Carolina apparently has no reported cases involving the
question of indemnity, prior to 1963, apart from those in which
there was a master-servant relationship. This is probably due,
at least in part, to the restrictive liability of this state's munici-
pal corporations.54 However, as early as 1875, the court was dis-
cussing indemnity situations with regard to whether a decision
fixing liability on the indemnitor would be conclusive as against
the indemnitee. 55
It seems never to have been questioned that a master has a
right of indemnity over against his servant when the master has
been held vicariously liable for the servant's tort.56 Mr. Justice
Jones' opinion in Shumpert v. Southern Ry. 57 is an example of
the reasoning sustaining this right of the master. He quotes from
Judge Cooley58 to the effect that some of the exceptions to the
rule barring indemnity rest upon reasons as forcible as those
that support the rule. These exceptions arise when the law holds
all of the parties liable to the injured party as tort-feasors, yet
among themselves, some are not wrongdoers at all. There are
many cases where a party, because of some relation, is charge-
able because of the conduct of others, such as where a railroad
is made liable for an injury caused by one of its servants. Both
parties are liable, but the moral wrong is the servant's and the
railroad is only liable through its obligation to be accountable
for the action of those to whom it entrusts its business. In an
action for indemnity the railroad bases no claim upon its own
wrong, but only upon that of the servant.
Of particular value in determining previous court opinion re-
garding the law of indemnity among joint tort-feasors is the
case of Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.59 Although the case
53. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443 (1927);
Rhame v. City of Sumter, 113 S.C. 151, 101 S.E. 832 (1920).
54. Dunn v. Barnwell, 43 S.C. 398, 21 S.E. 315 (1894).
55. Smith v. Moore, 7 S.C. 209 (1875).
56. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., 244 S.C. 79, 135
S.E.2d 613 (1964); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132
S.E.2d 172 (1963); Cannady v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 166 S.C. 35, 164
S.E. 235 (1932); Beauchamp v. Winnsboro Co., 113 S.C. 522, 101 S.E. 856
(1920); Ilderton v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting Co., 113 S.C. 145, 101
S.E. 282 (1919); Sparks v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 109 S.C. 145, 95 S.E.
344 (1918) ; Jones v. Southern Ry., 106 S.C. 20. 90 S.E. 183 (1916) ; Shumpert
v. Southern Ry., 65 S.C. 332, 43 S.E. 813 (1902).
57. 65 S.C. 332, 43 S.E. 813 (1902).
58. COOLEY, TORTS (2d ed. 1888).
59. Supra note 53.
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involved a master-servant relationship, Mr. Justice Blease
strongly implies in dicta that the law of South Carolina does not
restrict this right of indemnity to the master-servant relation-
ship:
In a leading and often cited case; Oceanic S. N. Co. v.
Compania T. E.,60 . . . in summing up conclusions based on
a review of various authorities and cases, the court said:
"... One who has been held legally liable for the per-
sonal neglect of another is entitled to indemnity from the
latter, no matter whether contractual relations existed be-
tween them or not. . . .The right to indemnity stands upon
the principle that everyone is responsible for the conse-
quences of his own negligence, and, if another person has
been compelled (by the judgment of a court having Juris-
diction) to pay the damages which ought to have been paid
by the wrongdoer, they may be recovered from him."
See, also, . . . Lowell v. Boston & L. R. Co..... (the
court's italics.)6 1
One other case, with somewhat analogous facts to Whetstone,
is worth discussion. This case, Washington Bridge Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Steel Co., 62 was decided in the United States Court of
Appeals, 4th Circuit on appeal from a West Virginia district
court, but it rests on common law principles and not West Vir-
ginia law. The opinion is by Judge Woods, formally an Asso-
ciate Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court, and is re-
ferred to at some length in Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R.03
Here the defendant bridge company entered into a contract
for the construction of a steel bridge over the Potomac River.
It sub-contracted with the plaintiff steel company to furnish and
put in position the steel girder spans. During the construction,
a pier supporting the steel work gave way, seriously injuring
an employee of plaintiff named Benning. He brought an action
against the steel company alleging negligence in not providing
him with a reasonably safe place to work. He recovered a judg-
ment against the steel company for 13,500 dollars. The steel com-
pany paid the judgment and then brought a suit for indemnity
60. 134 N.Y. 461, 467, 31 N.E. 987, 989 (1892). This case held that where
a judgment is recovered against the lessee of a wharf for injuries to a person
caused by a defect due to the negligence of a sublessee and occupant, and to
which the lessee did not contribute, he may sue the sublessee for indemnity.
61. 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839). See text accompanying note 13, Supra.
62. 215 Fed. 32 (4th Cir. 1914).
63. Supra note 53.
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against the bridge company, claiming that the cause of the col-
lapse was the negligence of the bridge company in not properly
inspecting the concrete piers which had been constructed by a
contractor of the bridge company, independent of the steel com-
pany, under the supervision of a bridge company engineer. In
his opinion Judge Woods stated the following:
If the record in the Benning case had shown that the
negligence of the steel company in failing to perform its
non-delegable duty of using due care to provide a reason-
ably safe place for Benning to work was necessarily due
solely to negligence of the bridge company in not exercising
due care to furnish a pier strong enough to bear the super-
structure, and could not have been due to any independent
breach of duty on the part of the steel company, then the
judgment in the Benning case would be conclusive of the
actionable negligence of the bridge company and of its lia-
bility to the steel company. This is the principle upon which
Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, . . and
a number of other cases were decided. 4
Along the same line of reasoning as the other South Carolina
cases, but broader in its implications, is the case of Little v.
Robert G. Lassiter & Co. 65 Here the court held that an agent
who unconsciously commits a tort at the direction of his prin-
cipal and is held liable is then entitled to indemnity from the
principal. Here the liability is not vicarious but rests on the act
of the agent; however, equity demands his restitution since he
is not a conscious wrongdoer.
From these cases it seems but a logical step to allow indemnity
to one who, though only passively negligent and without moral
or social fault, has been held liable in damages because of the
active and conscious wrongdoing of a third party. It can at least
be clearly seen that prior to the Whetstone decision the court felt
that the right of indemnity in South Carolina was not restricted
to those cases in which a master had been held vicariously liable
for the tort of a servant.
IV. SUMX ARY AND CONCLISION
The various courts in the United States have, in general, re-
stricted the right of indemnity among joint tort-feasors to cases
64. Supra note 62, at 35.
65. 156 S.C. 286, 153 S.E. 128 (1930).
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where one party is actively and one passively negligent (not in
pan delicto). This right seems to be a clear one and has been
clearly defined.
This definition can be best illustrated, in summary, by discuss-
ing three cases in which these indemnity actions arise.
First, no right of indemnity exists where both parties are
passively negligent. An example of this line of reasoning is the
case of Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R.16 Here
the plaintiff was in the business of switching railroad cars deliv-
ered to its stockyards. The defendant delivered to the plaintiff
a refrigerator car of the Hammond Packing Company to be
further transferred to that company. The car had been obtained
by the defendant from a third party. It was defective, but while
this defect was discoverable upon a reasonable inspection, neither
the defendant nor the plaintiff made such an inspection. Subse-
quently one of the employees of the plaintiff was thrown from
the car and injured. The employee recovered from the plaintiff
who in turn sued the defendant for indemnity. The court held
that this case did not fall within the exception to the general
rule denying indemnity:
In all these cases the wrongful act of the one held finally
liable created the unsafe or dangerous condition from which
the injury resulted. The principal and moving cause, result-
ing in the injury sustained, was the act of the first wrong-
doer, and the other has been held liable to third persons for
failing to discover or correct the defect caused by the posi-
tive act of the other.
In the present case, the negligence of the parties has been
of the same character. Both the railroad company and ter-
minal company failed, by proper inspection, to discover the
defective condition.
67
Second, the right of indemnity clearly exists when the parties
are not in par delicto. In the case of Old Oolony R.R. v.
Rlavens,68 defendants had a contract for carrying the mail from
plaintiff's railroad station in Boston to the post office. One of
defendant's employees took a load of mailbags from a train and
left them on the station platform in such manner that they
became an obstruction. A third party was injured when he fell
66. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
67. Id. at 228.
68. 148 Mass. 363, 19 N.E. 327 (1889).
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over them. lie sued the plaintiff and recovered a judgment. The
plaintiff then sued the defendant for indemnity. The court held
that the plaintiff had a right of indemnity from the defendant:
The verdict establishes it as a fact that the defendants
might have done the work of transferring and loading the
mail bags without obstructing the sidewalk as it was ob-
structed on the occasion of the injury to [the third party]....
[W]e think the plaintiff and the defendants were not, as
to each other, in pari delicto. The plaintiff was held liable
to [the third party] because bound to keep the sidewalk rea-
sonably safe. But, the ground of the present action is that
the defendants by their negligent act exposed the plaintiff
to this liability. The plaintiff's neglect to keep the sidewalk
safe did not make the plaintiff a joint wrongdoer with the
defendants in any such sense as to prevent the plaintiff from
recovering. 6
9
Third, where both parties are actively negligent there is no
right of indemnity. In the case of Jacobs v. General Ace., F. & L.
Assur. Oorp.,70 the pertinent facts alleged were that A and B
were racing in their automobiles on a Milwaukee street. In avoid-
ing a collision with C, who pulled out of a side street, B lost con-
trol of his car and then struck a parked car injuring X and Y,
his two passengers. X and Y then brought an action against B
and C. C served a cross-complaint against B for indemnity,
claiming that the plaintiff's injuries were due only to his simple
negligence while B was grossly negligent in causing the injury.
The court held that no right of indemnity existed:
The facts of this case do not fit into any of the type situa-
tions where indemnity has ordinarily been awarded. Here
we have a liability for injury directly produced (allegedly)
by the improper operation of cars by two drivers. One was
morally more reprehensible because he was so reckless as to
be deemed guilty of intentional wrong. Both violated the
same type of duty to others, including each other, as well as
plaintiffs. The liability-generating conduct of each was vir-
tually simultaneous. No legal relationship existed between
them before this occurrance. . . . We decide that in a case
like the present one, where there is no distinction between
the tort-feasors with respect to the causal relationship be-
69. Id. at 366, 19 N.E. at 372-73.
70. 14 Wis2d 1, 109 N.W.2d 462 (1961).
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tween their conduct and the injury, the negligent tort-feasor
is not entitled to indemnity from the grossly negligent one.
71
In seems clear that in the Whetstone case, the Atlantic Coast
Line was held liable to its employee solely by reason of its pas-
sive negligence in failing to discover the dangerous condition
created by Whetstone. There was no moral or social fault on the
part of the railroad, as it was not even conscious of the fact that
the dangerous condition existed. The case clearly falls within the
second class of cases in which settled principles of law declare
a right of indemnity to exist.
The South Carolina court, however, when presented with this
classic fact situation in which these principles of law were avail-
able to allow the granting of indemnity, refused to exercise its
prerogative to grant that right, and in a sweeping decision, im-
plied that no right of indemnity exists in South Carolina other
than to a master held vicariously liable for the torts of a servant.
The court largely predicated this decision on cases from other
jurisdictions, all of which when closely analyzed are consistent
with the plaintiff's right to recovery.
72
Although the court states that the rule that there is no right
to indemnity between joint tort-feasors is subject to many ex-
ceptions, it is difficult to see, under the language of the decision,
how any could exist. The crux of the majority opinion is, "Since
the appellant now asserts its right to indemnity from the re-
spondent, such action presupposes actionable negligence of both
parties towards the employee. . . . Therefore, the appellant and
the respondent were joint tort-feasors and their several acts
united to produce the injury sustained by the employee of the
appellant."7 3 The court then concludes, "It is our conclusion
that the appellant and the respondent were joint tort-feasors
and even though their acts of negligence were of different de-
grees, such united and concurred to produce the injury sustained
by Monteith. We think the trial judge correctly sustained the
demurrer interposed by the respondent because there can be no
indemnity among mere joint tort-feasors."7 4
By this definition, the concepts of active and passive negli-
gence (not in pari delicto) are precluded from any consideration
71. Id. at 9, 11, 109 N.W.2d at 466, 467-68.
72. For a thorough discussion of these cases see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
73. 243 S.C. at 68, 132 S.E.2d at 175.
74. Id. at 70, 132 S.E.2d at 176.
[Vol. 17
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss3/6
COMMENTS
in this state. Since the right of indemnity can only arise when
the indemnitee has been guilty of actionable negligence, by the
court's reasoning, this alone would preclude an indemnity action.
The breadth of this conclusion must have been intended by the
court since they expressly made one exception, "Let it be under-
stood that our decision in nowise encroaches upon the rule that
an employer has a right of action over against his employee
where the employer has been made liable to a third party by
reason of the employee's negligence."7 5
This result clearly appears to be contrary to the law in other
jurisdictions and is not based upon any previous South Carolina
law.
Whetstone undoubtedly would have been held liable to the
employee, Monteith. If he had been held to be likewise liable to
the Atlantic Coast Line, he would not have been denied the pro-
tection of any rule of law, and such a finding would have been
in accord with principles of equity and justice. "Cases of this
type furnish classic examples of factual situations in which jus-
tice required the formulation of rules allowing indemnity, even
though the party seeking it is technically tarred with the stigma
of joint tort-feasor. 76
The lhets8tone decision was handed down slightly less than
two years ago, but within a year the court suggested a limitation
of that decision to cases in which no legal relationship existed
between the parties.77 This is not, however, a sufficient expan-
sion to meet that which is required by all rules of justice in these
cases.
In 1927, Mr. Justice Blease, speaking for the South Carolina
Supreme Court, stated with regard to a case decided only a few
years previously what would seem equally applicable here:
The writer admits . . .that there is some strength in the
suggestion that it is better not to "compass" the destruction
of a decision "before the ink is dry upon that decision,"
except in instances where the decision destroyed is absolutely
out of harmony with the holdings of this court for many
years, and when the effect of the decision is to bring about
an upheaval in the administration of justice in our courts.
...When a decision should be overruled, however, for the
75. Id. at 71, 132 S.E.2d at 176.
76. Id. at 82, 132 S.E2d at 182 (dissenting opinion).
77. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., 244 S.C. 79, 135
S.E.2d 613 (1964).
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excellent purpose of aiding "in bringing our people to a
greater respect of our laws and the courts," this court should
not hesitate to overrule it.78
JoHM J. MCKA Y
78. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 142 S.C. 125, 163, 140 SYE. 443,
455-56 (1927).
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JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION
TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS V.
MINIMUM CONTACT
In November of 1964 the question of establishing jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation came before the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in the case of Phillips v. Knapp Monarch.' Mr.
Phillips, the appellant, was a Greenville retailer who was in-
jured when a coffee pot manufactured by Knapp Monarch
exploded. The coffee pot, which was manufactured at the re-
spondent's plant in St. Louis, Missouri, was sold to the appellant
by an independent distributor in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Although the respondent's products enjoyed substantial circula-
tion in South Carolina, he was neither licensed to do business
here nor did he have any agents present in the state.
In a continuance of the policy formulated by prior decisions,
the court refused to sustain Mr. Phillip's contention that juris-
diction could be established over the foreign corporation and
service of process effected under Section 10-424 of South Caro-
lina Code Annotated (1952) .2 The court, through Mr. Justice
Brailsford, pointed out that the statute requires transaction of
business within the state by the foreign corporation before effec-
tive service of process can be achieved. Since there was no trans-
action of business as South Carolina interprets the phrase,3 the
court had no jurisdiction and dismissed appellant's petition.
Given the above fact situation in light of South Carolina's
current statutory provision, certainly no one can argue with the
correctness of this decision. A study of authorities from other
jurisdictions as well as several recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, however, seems to indicate that the South Caro-
lina Legislature should give some thought to extending the cov-
erage of the present jurisdiction statute.
A brief look at the historical development of jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations might prove helpful in studying this
subject.
Originally the test of a state's power to subject a foreign
corporation to jurisdiction was whether the corporation was
actually incorporated within the forum state. Under this view
the corporation was an artificial person which existed only with-
1. Phillips v. Knapp Monarch, __ S.C. , 140 S.E2d 786 (1965).
2. Ibid.
3. See footnotes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
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in the territorial confines of the sovereignty which created it.
4
As a result, jursdiction could be acquired only by service of
process on the head officer of the corporation and this event had
to occur within the borders of the state of incorporation. 5 Con-
sequently it was virtually impossible for a state to establish
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation without its consent.
This theory, enunciated in Banko of Augusta v. Earle,6 soon
grew to be too cumbersome for America's rapidly expanding in-
dustrial community. As the practice of multi-state business trans-
actions and long distance product delivery arose, so did the need
for the states to find some ground upon which jurisdiction could
be established over a foreign corporation. The approach which
became most widely adopted was to make consent to be sued a
condition precedent to the foreign corporation's transaction of
business in a state. This method was based on the theory that
since a corporation was not a citizen under the privileges-and-
immunities clause of the Constitution, it had no inherent right
to do business in any state other than that of its incorporation7
The view that a foreign corporation had to receive authoriza-
tion from the state before it could transact any business soon ran
into opposition on the grounds that such a requirement inter-
ferred with interstate business and was a violation of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however,
laid this argument to rest when it held that though the com-
merce clause gave a corporation the right to do interstate busi-
ness, the amenability to suit, through this consent theory, was a
reasonable restriction which could be imposed by the state, even
if the corporation was engaged exclusively in interstate business."
In applying the consent theory the courts did not hesitate to
use it even if the corporation had not appointed an agent to
receive service of process in the foreign state. The apparent
rationale behind this was that the courts were not going to allow
corporations to escape amenability to suit simply because they
refused to comply with the state's statutory provisions.
A subsequent theory of jurisdiction which enjoyed some usage
was that of implied corporate presence. This was a modification
of the actual presence theory whereby, rather than demanding
4. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 591 (1839).
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
6. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
7. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1869).
8. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
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actual physical presence in the forum state as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction, the court would imply or construe the corporation
as being present in the state if the corporation could be found
to be doing business there. Although this theory was first ad-
vanced in 1882,9 it was not independently used to sustain juris-
diction until 1914.10
Under both the implied consent and presence theories the test
for determining jurisdiction was whether the corporation was
at the determinative time "doing business" in the forum state."
The most disputed question of these theories became the extent
of activity on the part of the foreign corporation that was nec-
essary before it would be deemed "doing business." Case law
suggests that a quantitative approach was used to determine this
issue. 12 This presented an obvious stumbling block to the courts
in that causes of action could accrue out of limited corporate
activity that was insufficient to establish "doing business" for
jurisdictional purposes, but which logically should have been
adjudicated in the state that found itself helpless because of this
"doing business" requirement.
It was not until 1945, in what has since become a landmark
case, that Mr. Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe v.
Washington,'8 laid to rest these rigid cumbersome theories and
replaced them with the more flexible doctrine of "minimum
contact." As was stated in his opinion:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way
to personal service of summons or other forms of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
14
The doctrine of International Shoe has since been consistently
applied by the courts of this country and has been used as a legis-
lative springboard for drafting jurisdiction statutes. The con-
cept that due process requires only that there be some definite
link, some minimum contact between the state and the person or
9. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
10. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
11. Id. at 583, 589.
12. Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960).
13. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. Id. at 316.
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corporation over whom it seeks to exercise its jurisdiction stands
firm today.
Twelve years after this decision, in McGee v. InternationaZ
Life Insurance Co., 5 a California resident was successful in a
suit against a Texas corporation. This corporation was not doing
business in the usual sense of the word in California but was
served with process in Texas pursuant to a California statute.
The United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause did not preclude the California court from entering a
judgment, stating that it was sufficient for the purpose of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had sub-
stantial connection with the state.
Since this decision holding that a single business transaction
is sufficient to establish the constitutionally required minimum
contact, a number of states have enacted wide-reaching jurisdic-
tion statutes.16 Of these, Illinois was the forerunner in enacting
a statute 17 comprehensively dealing with personal jurisdiction
and plainly attempting to occupy the entire field of its constitu-
tional power under the liberalization of the due process clause
in International Shoe and subsequent cases.' 8
In essence these states by enacting these single act statutes
have merely attempted to spell out what would be sufficient
minimum contact, and in so doing have provided the courts with
more definite guidelines in the formerly nebulous area of juris-
diction. A typical example of this type of statute is that of New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules, Sec. 302, which reads as
follows:
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary,
or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in
15. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1963); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 17
1963) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92
1957) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 112, §21 (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN.
303.13 (Supp. 1962); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-2702-2B (Supp. 1963);
NEv. Rav. STAT. § 14.080 (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1963);
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES §302 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-145
1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953) ; TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. art. 2031b
4) (1964) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §855 (1958) ; WAsH. REv. CODE §4.28.185
1962) ; W. VA. CODE § 3083 (1961) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1963).
17. ILL. REv. STAT. C. 110, §17 (1963).
18. McGee v. ILternational Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if,
in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a
cause of action for defamation of character arising from
the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated
within the state.
(b) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is
based solely upon this section, an appearance does not con-
fer such jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not
arising from an act enumerated in this section.
Comparing South Carolina's statute10 to that of New York
or any of the other states with similar statutes, it is apparent
that our courts must find sufficient activity by the nonresident
corporation within the state to support a claim of general juris-
diction whereas the so-called single act statutes will allow spe-
cific jurisdiction. Basically the distinction between the two is
that under the single act statutes a court can exercise jurisdiction
over defendants who perform single or occasional acts which,
because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of
their commission, may be deemed sufficient contact to subject
the defendant to personal jurisdiction, but only on causes of
action related to those acts. For example a New York court would
have jurisdiction over a New Jersey corporation in a tort action
for an injury caused by one of its products that was shipped
into the state,20 although the court would not have jurisdiction
over the same corporation for a cause of action not related to the
injury-causing activity.
On the other hand, under the general jurisdiction statutes
(such as South Carolina's) it is essential that the court have
complete jurisdiction over the nonresident corporation in all
matters before it can force such a corporation to answer for any
cause of action, regardless of the nature or quality of the act
from which the cause of action arises.
In order for a South Carolina court to obtain general jurisdic-
tion over such a corporation it is essential that the non-domi-
19. S.C. CoDE Axx. § 10-424 (1962).
20. Johnson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 43
Misc.2d 850, 252 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1964).
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ciliary corporation be physically present in this state.21 That
is to say that at one time or another the corporation must have
someone actually transacting business within the borders of this
state. Although at first blush this may appear to be a reasonable
position, a brief study of the matter in light of modern mer-
chandising practices will show that many inequities result
therefrom.
Under our current statute if a foreign corporation accepts
orders for his products from South Carolina customers and then
delivers the same products in his own trucks into this state, he is
said to be transacting business in South Carolina and will be
amenable to suit here.22 On the other hand if the nonresident
corporation does the same thing with the exception of placing
the goods on a carrier out of state, f.o.b. plant, he will not be
amenable to suit in South Carolina.23 When a Massachusetts
corporation supplied its products under contracts to dealers in
South Carolina but accepted the orders and placed them on a
carrier out of state, even though the corporation had a solicita-
tion agent present in South Carolina, it was held that it did not
have sufficient ties with this state to justify jurisdiction here.24
A similar factual situation involving a Georgia corporation was
decided the same way.
25
Today it is no longer necessary for a manufacturer or pro-
ducer to send personal agents or representatives into an area
that he is or hopes to financially exploit. With the modern
methods of communication and improved practices in long dis-
tance delivery a manufacturer can now set up his plant in the
most obscure location in the country; hawk his wares by radio,
television and magazines; take orders by mail, telephone and
telegraph; and deliver them by trucks, trains, ships and air-
planes. Such a producer can directly focus his sales and deliv-
eries into a state as though he were a domiciliary, thus deriving
a substantial source of revenue. He can be as much in competi-
tion with local merchants and foreign corporations authorized
to do business here as though he were personally present in the
state, but he will be insulated from suit here simply because he
is not actually physically present.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-424 (1962).
22. Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., Inc., 304 F.2d 102 (1962).
23. State v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 172 S.C. 415, 174 S.E. 385 (1934).
24. Springs Cotton Mills v. Machinecraft, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.S.C.
1957).
25. Zeigler v. Puritan Mills, 188 S.C. 367, 199 S.E. 420 (1938).
[Vol. 17
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss3/6
COMMENTS
An example of such a situation now present in South Carolina
is the large discount or wholesale store that orders large quanti-
ties of goods from out of state to be sold to residents of this
state. Frequently these establishments send their buyers to the
factories or distribution centers to purchase the goods and have
them shipped into South Carolina via independent carriers or
the retailers' or wholesalers' own trucks. If through such a trans-
action a negligently manufactured product should find its way
into this state causing an injury to the ultimate purchaser of
the product, the purchaser would have no recourse against the
manufacturer in the courts of this state. If the person so injured
were not the actual purchaser of the product but rather a mem-
ber of the purchaser's family or a guest, he would have no re-
course at all in South Carolina because of the privity require-
ment,26 unless he could show negligence on the part of the
retailer.
The end result of this state of affairs is to make a corporation
virtually judgment-proof because the injured party would be
faced with the tremendous expense of litigating in a distant
forum, unless the damages are in excess of $10,000, in which case
the claimant could bring his action in a federal court. Even if
the claimant could absorb the expense of foreign litigation it
would be extremely difficult for him to obtain witnesses who
would or could travel to the place of the trial.
It would seem that the sheer momentum of twentieth century
development and the increasing expansion in trade between the
states and nonresidents would force the South Carolina legis-
lature to give some thought toward extending the current statu-
tory provisions for jurisdiction, such as a number of other states
have done. In so doing it would be protecting citizens of this
state against any happening similar to the above situation. This
is not to say that there should be a total abrogation of state
borders or an evacuation of sound jurisdictional policies, but
rather that we should take a more realistic position toward for-
eign corporations which are competing with domestic corpora-
tions in channels of intrastate commerce. As stated by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren in Hansonv . Denkla :27
[T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff
26. For discussion on the state of privity in S.C. see Note, 17 S.C.L.REv.
259 (1965).
27. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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: . . to the flexible standard of International Shoe v. Wash-
ington .... But it is a mistake to assume that this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the per-
sonal jurisdictions of the state courts. . . . Those restric-
tions are more than a guarantee of immunity from incon-
venient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tri-
bunal, the defendant may not be called on to do so unless
he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that state that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
As long as there is a definite connection between the nonresi-
dent corporation and the state it is only just to require it to
answer to our state courts. It would seem that, when a foreign
corporation purposefully ships products into this state and at-
tempts to compete with local merchants and to sell to our public,
this would be a sufficient connection for the purpose of minimum
contact.
The degree of such a corporation's exploitation of the local
market should not be the determinative factor in deciding juris-
diction, for as stated by Mr. Justice Stone in the Intemnational
Shoe case, "the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corpo-
ration to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechani-
cal or quantitative." 28 The test should not be how much business
the nonresident does, but rather what connection there is between
the state and the activity from which the cause of action arose.
As long as this connection between the activity and the state
can be found, there would seem to be no arbitrary exercise of
power since the nonresident has the protection of the state's laws
while acting herein. If a foreign corporation voluntarily elects
to exploit our market it should be answerable to our state courts.
The consequences imputed to it lie within its own control, since
it need not send its products into this state unless it so desires.
It is foreseeable that the situation could develop in which the
corporation's product finds its way into this state through no
fault or effort of its own, for example, if a resident buys some-
thing out of state and brings it in himself, or a situation in
which you have a valid independent intervening distributor.
Under these circumstances it would indeed be a violation of the
28. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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defendant's right of due process to force him to answer to the
purchaser's state courts.29 Of course under such circumstances
the requirement of contact would be missing and this would
present no problem to a properly drawn jurisdiction statute.
Such a statute should also prescribe that jurisdiction will be con-
ferred for the purpose of the specific litigation arising out of
the particular activity from which the cause of action arose with-
in the state. Again it would be a violation of the defendant's
right of due process to subject a nonresident to this state's juris-
diction for a cause of action not related to the activity through
which contact was satisfied and jurisdiction acquired.
The development of the right of a state to force a nonresident
corporation to submit to its jurisdiction has been slow but steady.
It has wound its way through cumbersome theories of actual
presence, implied consent, and implied presence through doing
business. It was not until the middle of this century that a flex-
ible and realistic theory was developed.
Now that such a theory has been enunciated by the highest
court of this land, it would seem that South Carolina should take
cognizance of this liberalization of the due process clause and
revise our current statutory provisions so as to take advantage
of it. In so doing, the legislature would be doing no more than
affording our citizens protection against the possibility of in-
curring an injury through no fault of their own, for which they
could find no recourse in the courts of this state.
WmiaAx MN. BowEN
29. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc. 123 Vt 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
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TORT LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY-RULES OF
INSURABLE INTEREST AND CONSENT
In a case of novel impression the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the insured's complaint stated a cause of action
in negligence where the defendant insurance company issued a
policy on the life of the insured to his wife as beneficiary with-
out the insured's knowledge or consent and the wife attempted
to poison the insured to collect the proceeds of the policy.1 A
search of the cases from other jurisdictions reveals only one
other decision allowing tort recovery under analogous facts.2
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the rights and reme-
dies of the insured under this and similar factual situations
against the insurer and to trace the development of a cause of
action in tort against the insurance company. Also to be con-
sidered is the burden of this precedent on the insurance company
balanced against the protection given to the insured to prevent
an opportunity for crime by some unworthy beneficiary.
When a person procures a policy of insurance on the life of
another where such person has no insurable interest or when the
insured has no knowledge or has not consented to the policy,
the courts have adopted two theories to render the policy unen-
forceable: (1) that such a policy is a wagering contract as a
speculation on the length of human life (2) that such a policy
presents an opportunity for crime.3
An insurable interest 4 is some benefit or advantage based on
the relationship of the parties, either pecuniary or by blood or
affinity, that the person procuring the insurance has in the con-
tinuation of the life of the party to be insured. 5 If this interest
is present the policy is not a wagering or a gaming contract on
human life in which the person procuring the insurance is in-
terested more in the death than the life of the insured. It also
provides protection against temptations to murder the insured
to collect the proceeds of the policy because of the natural affec-
1. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
2. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696, 61
A.L.R.2d 1346 (1957).
3. See generally, 29 AT. JuR. Insurance §§ 231, 433-34 (1960); 3 CoucH,
INSURANCE §24:118 (2d ed. 1960).
4. For an exhaustive analysis of this doctrine see Patterson, Insurable
Interest, 18 COLUm. L. Rv. 381 (1918).
5. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1882); Crosswell v. Connecticut Indem.
Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 28 S.E. 200 (1897).
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tion between the parties.6 The authorities are not in agreement
on the relationship sufficient to constitute an insurable interest.
However, it is generally agreed, that there is an insurable in-
terest between brothers, 7 parent and child,8 husband and wife,9
and creditor and debtor.10 On the other hand, there is no insur-
able interest present in the relationship of nephew and aunt,"
or where the relationship is that of aunt-in-law and niece-in-
law.12 Generally a person may take out a policy on his own life
and designate the beneficiary whether the latter has an insur-
able interest or not. The insurable interest of the insured in his
own life prevents running afoul of the wagering contract doc-
trine.13 The assignment of a policy procured by the insured with
his consent to one without an insurable interest is valid and the
policy is enforceable. 14
Whether the insured has consented to or has knowledge of
the procurement of the policy has been relied on by the courts
to judge its validity.'5 These cases hold that policies issued with-
out the knowledge or consent of the insured are void or voidable
because there was no authority to make the life insurance con-
tract,' 6 or that this lack of authority destroys the insurable
interest of the beneficiary17 and therefore subjects the insured
to great dangers and are against public policy.' 8 The theories
of insurable interest and consent as determining whether a life
policy is valid have also tended to set the limits of the rights and
remedies of the insured or beneficiaries in these cases.
6. Ibid.
7. Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 89, 133 S.E. 215 (1926).
8. Crosswell v. Connecticut Indem. Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 28 S.E. 200 (1897).
9. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monohan, 102 Ky. 13, 42 S.W. 924 (1897).
10. Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 Atl. 890 (1889).
11. Elmore v. Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 504, 198 S.E. 5 (1938).
12. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696
(1957).
13. Ellison v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 216 S.C. 475, 58 S.E.2d 890
(1950); Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemn. Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 28 S.E. 200
(1897). Contra, Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274 (1894).
14. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Crosswell v. Connecticut
Indemn. Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 28 S.E. 200 (1897). Contra, Cheeves v. Anders,
87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274 (1894).
15. See generally, 3 CoucH, INsuRAxcE § 24:123 (2d ed. 1960).
16. Callicott v. Dixie Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 198 Ark. 69, 127 S.W.2d 620
(1939); American Benefit Life Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, 183 Ark. 47, 34
S.W.2d 1082 (1931).
17. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monohan, 102 Ky. 13, 42 S.W. 924 (1897);
Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964) ; Hack v.
Metz, 173 S.C. 413, 176 S.E. 314 (1934); Moseley v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,
167 S.C. 112, 166 S.E. 94 (1932).
18. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
1965]
33
et al.: Comments
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
SOUTH CAROLA LAW REVIEW
Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co.19 held that a cause of action
in tort was stated against the insurance company for negligent
issuance of a policy on the insured's life without his knowledge
or consent. The wife of the insured procured the policy and at-
tempted to collect the proceeds by giving the husband-insured
arsenic. The defendant insurance company demurred to the com-
plaint on the grounds that the wife had an insurable interest
in the life of the husband and that the intervening criminal act
of the wife was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury and
this act was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Circuit
Judge Eppes overruled the demurrer and the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed.
20
The case relied heavily on Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Weldo, 21 which held insurance companies liable for issuing life
policies to an aunt-in-law on her niece-in-law when the aunt-in-
law murdered the insured to collect the proceeds. The father of
the young girl sued for wrongful death on the theory that the
insurance company had negligently issued the policies to the
aunt-in-law, who had no insurable interest in her niece-in-law,
and that the defendants could reasonably foresee that their fail-
ure to ascertain this interest could, and did, lead to the murder
of the insured. The Alabama court cited an early case in that
state22 which said that the primary reason for not allowing a
life insurance policy where the beneficiary had no insurable
interest was that "a constant temptation is created to commit for
profit the most atrocious of crimes. 23 Since there was no insur-
able interest present in this case between the aunt-in-law and
niece-in-law and the very purpose of the rule was to prevent an
opportunity for murder the case held that the insurance company
had a duty to use reasonable care to ascertain the interest of the
aunt-in-law before issuing the policy.24 This duty was rested
on the general tort theory that all persons must "exercise reason-
able care not to injure another."25
19, Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1957).
22. Helmtag's Adm'x v. Miller, 75 Ala. 183 (1884).
23. Id. at 187. The case held that an assignment of a policy procured by the
insured to a creditor over the amount of the debt was void and against public
policy and is therefore, in this respect, opposed to the South Carolina and
majority view. Cases cited note 14 supra.
24. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696
(1957).
25. Id. at 185, 100 So. 2d at 708.
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In the Ramey case26 our court has equated "no insurable inter-
est" with "no consent" and reached the same results. This case
imposes on the insurance company the burden of ascertaining
not only the insurable interest of the party procuring the policy
but also the insured's consent to the policy before it is issued.
The Ramey case was a more difficult case for the plaintiff than
the WeZdon case 2T because in Ramey the policy was procured by
the insured's wife who, as a general rule, has an insurable inter-
est in her husband.28- The court met this argument by pointing
out that a person has no insurable interest under a contract
which he had no authority to make; and where the insured has
no knowledge or has not consented to the issuance of the policy
the wife here would not as a matter of law have an insurable
interest.
2 9
A Kentucky case3 0 was perhaps the strongest authority that
the wife had no insurable interest in the life of the husband in
the Ramey case. There the wife took out a policy on the husband
without his knowledge or consent and allegedly paid the pre-
miums with the husband's money. In a suit by the husband for
return of the premiums the court stated:
It is certainly against public policy for one to procure a
policy of insurance on the life of another without such one's
knowledge or consent. The wife has an insurable interest
in the life of the husband; yet she could not obtain insur-
ance upon his life without his knowledge and consent.
Neither should the husband be allowed to procure a policy
of insurance on the life of the wife without her knowledge
and consent. If such practice was indulged, it might be a
fruitful source of crime.3 '
The defendant in Ramey contended that although the wife
may not have had an insurable interest in her husband, and that
26. 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
27. 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1957).
28. Connecticut Mut'l Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1877) ; Crosswell v.
Connecticut Indemn. Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 28 S.E. 200 (1897). The interest is
pecuniary, i.e., support of husband and the natural affection of husband and
wife which protects the insured.
29. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 20-21, 135 S.E.2d 362, 364-
65 (1964). The court cites 2 JoycE, INSURANCE § 892 (2d ed. 1917) but this
statement is supported by citation of cases involving property insurance where
the party did not own the property sought to be insured and, therefore, seems
distinguishable from the reasons for the rule requiring insurable interest in
life policies.
30. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mvonohan, 102 Ky. 13, 42 S.W. 924 (1897).
31. Id. at 14-15, 42 S.W. at 924.
1965]
35
et al.: Comments
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
458 SoUTH CAROLINA LAw R Evmw [Vol. 1r
the policy was void when issued without his knowledge or con-
sent, such facts did not allow the plaintiff to recover in tort.
The case of Hollomon v. Life Ins. Go.32 was the basis of the
defendant's argument. In Holloman the defendant insurance
company's agent had asked the plaintiff to allow her son to
take out a policy on her life. She had refused but the agent told
the son that his mother had consented. The policy was later can-
celled and the plaintiff brought suit. The court rejected an action
for fraud and deceit because the misrepresentations were made
to the son and there was no reliance on them by the plaintiff.
An action for invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy was
likewise rejected by the court because the plaintiff was not sub-
jected to any unwarranted publicity. The third theory advanced
was that the plaintiff had been subjected to the dangers of specu-
lative insurance. The court stated:
While this point does not appear to have ever come before
this court, the authorities generally are to the effect that
except in the case of an infant a policy of life insurance
taken out without the knowledge or consent of the insured
person is not enforceable. . . We have not found any au-
thority, however, for the view that the issuance of a policy
of life insurance without the consent of the insured would
give rise to a cause of action in tort in favor of the insured
person. But even if this might be true under some excep-
tional circumstances, we find nothing in the complaint here
from which damages to the plaintiff could be inferred.33
Judge Eppes in Ramey found that the "exceptional circum-
stances" were present because the husband had alleged injury
from the arsenic given him by the wife.34
One point not discussed by the court in Ramey, however, was
that in Hollo rnan the son had procured the policy without the
insured's consent and the argument was made that the plaintiff
was subjected to the danger of a wagering contract; but this
contention failed with the answer that the son had an insurable
interest in the plaintiff.35 This is difficult to reconcile with the
court's reasoning in Ramey that the wife had no insurable in-
terest because the insured-husband had not consented to the
policy. It seems arguable, however, that the court has used the
32. 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
33. Id. at 457, 7 S.E.2d at 170, 171.
34. 244 S.C. 16, 23, 135 S.E.2d 362, 366 (1964).
35. 192 S.C. 454, 457-58, 7 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1940).
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insurable interest rule or the theory of consent or knowledge to
reach a just result to protect the insured.
Another interesting issue in the Ramey case was the plea by
the defendant that the criminal act of the wife was an inde-
pendent intervening cause and that the plaintiff's injury was
not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. This contention
failed when the court found that the primary reason for not
allowing life insurance of this kind was to prevent crime and
therefore the criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. The de-
fendant's negligent issuance of the policy was the proximate
cause of the injury.38
Another line of cases involving the murder of the insured by
the beneficiary is relevant here. In Henderson v. Life Ins. Co.,
7
a foster-father procured a life policy on his step-son with the
intention of murdering the insured. After the foster-father had
murdered the insured, the victim's mother brought an action for
the proceeds. The court held that the policy was void in its in-
ception because it was procured with the intent to murder the
insured and the beneficiary had no insurable interest in the
insured. The defendant insurance company consequently was not
required to pay the proceeds to the insured's estate. It was also
pointed out that the defense of insurable interest could not be
waived, which put to rest dicta to the contrary in earlier deci-
sions.a Keels v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.39 and Smitk v.
Todd40 were distinguished because, although the beneficiary had
killed the insured and the insured's estate recovered the pro-
ceeds, the insured had procured the policy and the beneficiary
had no motive to kill the insured when the policy was issued.4 1
The courts have utilized the doctrine of insurable interest and
consent to declare life policies unenforceable in a variety of
cases. Where the beneficiary sues for the proceeds on a policy
obtained without the consent of the insured, recovery has been
denied ;42 also where there was an assignment to one without an
36. 244 S.C. 16, 27, 135 S.E.2d 362, 367-68 (1964). This aspect of the case
is beyond the purpose of this comment but see Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1964) citing RESTATEMENT ToRTs §448
(1934) which was relied on by Judge Eppes in the Ramey case.
37. 176 S.C. 100, 179 S.E. 680 (1935).
38. Id. at 130, 179 S.E. at 692.
39. 159 S.C. 520, 157 S.E. 834 (1931).
40. 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930).
41. Henderson v. Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 100, 132-33, 179 S.E. 680, 693
(1935).
42. Callicott v. Dixie Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 198 Ark. 69, 127 S.W.2d 620
(1939) ; Moseley v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 167 S.C. 112, 166 S.E. 94 (1932).
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insurable interest and without the consent of the insured to the
assignment, recovery has been denied, even though the insured
was a minor.48 The insured can, however, maintain an action
against the insurance company for return of the premiums paid
to the company on a policy procured by his wife without his
consent, if he can prove that the premiums were paid with his
money.44 A beneficiary's claim has been allowed for return of
premiums from the insurance company, where the beneficiary
has no insurable interest and the policy is void, on the ground
of a failure of consideration because the company undertook no
risk on the policy. 45 As shown by the Ramey46 and Weldon
4 7
cases these same rules have been applied to allow the insured or
his estate a cause of action in tort. This extension of these rules
has been questioned 4s because the early application of the doc-
trine was contractual as shown by the above cases, and the pur-
pose of the rule requiring insurable interest was said to be to
prevent wagering or gaming, and not to prevent crime.
49
The use of insurable interest and consent as a deterrent to
crime5 O seems justified: "The very meaning of an insurable
interest is an interest in having the life continue and so one that
is opposed to crime." 51 The Tennessee court 52 takes the view
that temptation of crime is "the more potent reason for condemn-
ing such insurance contracts"; as has Texas: "the paramount
reason for holding such insurance to be unlawful .. . is, the
danger in offering an inducement to destroy human life."8 3 The
Weldon case states: "The rule is designed to protect human life.
Policies in violation of the insurable interest rule are not dan-
gerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because they are
43. Hack v. Metz, 173 S.C. 413, 176 S.E. 314 (1934).
44. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monohan, 102 Ky. 13, 42 S.W. 924 (1897).
45. Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Cook, 19 Tenn. App. 290, 86 S.W.2d 887
(1935).
46. 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
47. 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1957).
48. Duesenberg, Insurer's Tort Liability for Issuing Policy Without Insur-
able Interest-A Comment, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 64 (1959).
49. Ibid.; accord, Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 Atl. 890 (1889). The con-
tention is that if it were, legacies and life estates would be void; however see
Patterson, Insurable Interest, 18 COLUm. L. REv. 381, 390-91 (1918) where the
distinction is made that at least in a legacy the ancestor consents to the situation.
50. Patterson, Insurable Interest, 18 COLUm. L. REv. 381, 385-86 (1918).
51. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911) (Holmes J.).
52. Interstate Life & Ace. Co. v. Cook, 19 Tenn. App. 290, 86 S.W2d 887,
892 (1935).
53. Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274, 276 (1894).
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dangerous."8' 4 South Carolina is in agreement with this proposi-
tion. In the Henderson case it is stated that to allow life insur-
ance without an insurable interest may
tend to incite the crime of murder, or operate to cause the
beneficiary to decline in the event of accident . ..to save
the life of the insured-and the rule is enforced, and the
defense permitted, not in the interest of the defendant in-
surer, but solely for the sake of the law, and in the interest
of a sound public policy .... 55
It is also stated in Crosswell v. Connecticut Indem. Assn that
with respect to life insurance .. . the matter of "insurable
interest" is important only in ascertaining whether the con-
tract is obnoxious to the public policy which condemns
gambling on the continuance of human life, because such
speculative contracts are supposed to tend to bring about
the death of the insured, by creating an interest in his
death.50
The Ramey case settles the question in South Carolina: "The
rule against issuing policies on the life of a person without his
knowledge or consent is 'designed to protect human life.' 15 It
would appear, therefore, that the better view is that these rules
are primarily for the protection of life. There is certainly more
need to safeguard the insured from murder or injury than to
void a policy because it is a form of speculation or gaming. The
function of the law is to redress civil wrongs with a remedy
and to act as a deterrent to crime. These rules provide convenient
tools to fulfill this dual task.
The duty placed on the insurance company to ascertain the
interest of the person procuring the policy5 and to obtain the
consent of the insured 9 should not be difficult to bear. They
could require their agents to investigate the relationship of the
parties thoroughly before a policy is issued, and to be certain
that it is sufficient to constitute an insurable interest. The con-
sent of the insured should not be a problem, but the company
has to be sure that the signature of the insured on the applica-
54. 267 Ala. 171, 186, 100 So. 2d 696, 708 (1957).
55. 176 S.C. 100, 131, 179 S.E. 680, 692 (1935).
56. 51 S.C. 103, 113, 28 S.E. 200, 204 (1897).
57. 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
58. Liberty Nat'1 Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696
(1957).
59. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
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tion has not been forged. 0 It may be suggested that the signa-
ture of the insured in the application could be verified by wit-
nesses, which would be one means the company could use to pro-
tect itself. The courts have balanced the burden placed on the
insurance company against the protection afforded human life
by these rules. Their decision to have it fall on the insurer is
proper both under sound logic and established legal principles.
JomN U. BPiL, III
60. Ibid.
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